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An empirical analysis of the decision to train apprentices
Abstract
It is a widely held belief that apprenticeship training represents a net investment for training firms, the
cost of which needs to be recouped after the training period. A new firm-level data set for Switzerland
reveals large variation in net costs across firms and, remarkably, negative net costs for 60 per cent of all
firms. We use these data to estimate the effect of net costs on the number of apprentices hired by a firm.
The results show that the costs have a significant impact on the training decision but no significant
influence on the number of apprentices, once the firm has decided to train. For policy purposes, these
results indicate that subsidies for firms that already train apprentices would not boost the number of
available training places.
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1 Introduction
Every year, almost 70,000 or more than half of the Swiss youngsters who complete their compul-
sory schooling choose to embark on what is called the dual education system, that is, a training
programme combining vocational education at school with training in and work for a company.
In order to guarantee each new cohort of school leavers that there is a sufficient number of firms
willing to offer training opportunities, it is important to know which factors affect the number of
apprentices hired by a firm. From an economic point of view, it seems obvious that a firm would
hire the more apprentices the higher the net benefit of apprenticeship training amounts to. So far,
most studies suggested that apprenticeship training results in net cost during the apprenticeship
(e.g. Beicht et al. 2004). This would imply that companies need to be able to recoup these net
cost by employing graduated apprentices as skilled workers and paying them a wage lower than
the value of their marginal productivity, because otherwise they would not offer an apprenticeship
programme.
The most recent study of the Swiss apprenticeship system shows, unlike other studies, that about
two thirds of the training firms find it profitable to train apprentices (Schweri et al. 2003). This
suggests that for the majority of training firms, the possibility to recoup the investment during the
apprenticeship training period is an important factor explaining their availability for training. That
not every single company is able to offer apprenticeship posts under the same favourable conditions
was subsequently pointed out by Wolter et al. (2006), who showed that the potential net cost of
non-training firms would be positive and considerably higher than those of training companies, if
they were to engage in training apprentices. These observations lead to the hypothesis that, at
least in Switzerland where the high flexibility of the labour market puts some restrictions on the
possibilities for firms to recoup training expenses after the training period has ended, the net cost
of training during the training period is a decisive argument in favour or against the training of
apprentices.
This paper extends the analyses made so far in testing directly whether the (potential) net cost
of training during the training period explain the training probability of firms. Furthermore, it is
estimated whether the net cost of training also affect the number of apprentices, once the decision
to train has been made. We use different types of count data models to account for the specific
structure underlying the firms’s decision process.
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The paper fills a gap in the training literature, as all previous studies (see section 3) estimating
the number of apprenticeship places offered by a firm were not able to include data on the cost and
benefit of the apprenticeship training in their analyses because of the lack of these data. The only
exception known to the authors is a study by Niederalt et al. (2001), using, however, a very small
and non-representative sample of firms.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses briefly the apprenticeship system in
Switzerland. Section 3 summarizes previous studies and motivates the hypothesis tested in this
paper. Section 4 introduces the data and the sample design. In Section 5, (potential) net cost are
estimated using a maximum likelihood selection model. Then, the effect of net cost on the number
of apprentices is estimated using different types of count data models. Section 6 concludes.
2 The apprenticeship system in Switzerland
The apprenticeship system is the route chosen by about 60 percent of the Swiss youngsters at upper
secondary level. More than 180,000 adolescents are currently embarked on what is called the dual
education system, that is, a training programme combining vocational education at school with
training in and work for a company. Almost half of the remaining 40 percent of young people who
complete compulsory education go on to attend grammar school (Gymnasium) to prepare them for
university and a more academic career. The remainder opt either for other entirely school-based
forms of education or pursues no form of post-compulsory education, placing Switzerland ahead of
other OECD countries in terms of the percentage of the over-16 population attending any form of
non-compulsory schooling.
Vocational training in a dual-education program usually lasts three to four years. Drop-out rates
were fairly low in the past. Based on the responses of training firms in the survey used for this article,
the drop out rates were on average 5 percent. Apprentices graduate with a diploma recognized
throughout Switzerland attesting that the apprentice has a professional qualification. The quality
of the training provided in Switzerland, which combines school lessons (1-2 days a week) with
on-the-job training in a firm under the supervision of certified staff, is recognized internationally
as meeting top standards. International comparisons show, in terms of scholastic and professional
qualifications, that Swiss apprentices are more than a match for their upper secondary level peers
attending school full-time (see e.g. Bierhoff and Prais 1997).
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The employment period ends automatically on completion of training. Any extension of the
employment period must be negotiated in a separate contract. Switzerland differs in this respect
from some other countries where apprentices are protected from dismissal for a period of time
after completing their training. Mobility is fairly high among young people who complete their
apprenticeship, with only 36 percent still working at their original training site one year on (see
Schweri et al. 2003).1
3 Previous studies
There have been several studies on the firm’s training decision in the last few years, but most of
them did not include data on the cost-benefit ratio of apprenticeship training at the firm-level.
Some of the studies described below used proxy variables for the cost-benefit ratio instead, and
others have simply ignored this possibility. On the other hand, the studies that have calculated
the cost and benefit of apprenticeship training did not use this information further to analyse its
impact on the firms’ training decision.
Concerning the training decision of firms, Harhoff and Kane (1997) found for Germany that
“firms are much more willing to train when there are fewer firms around to poach their trainees”
(p.184). They also showed that firms are less likely to train or train less apprentices if the work
force in counties, or counties in commuting distance, is large.
Neuba¨umer and Bellmann (1999) also examined German firms without data on cost and benefit.
Their data set contained, however, qualitative assessments by the non-training firms of the factors
affecting the training decision. Their findings were, that about two thirds of the firms do not
train because they do not meet the legal requirements for offering apprenticeship training. For
the remaining third of the non-training companies, an unfavourable cost-benefit ratio was one of
the main reasons not to train. Further, the analysis of the training intensity of training firms
showed that the firm size is the major factor explaining the ratio of apprentices and total number
of employees. Similar to Switzerland, the majority of all apprentices in Germany are trained by
small firms with less than 50 employees. Wolter and Schweri (2002) found similar results for the
training intensity amongst training firms in Switzerland, but in addition, the net cost of training
also had a significant impact, even if other factors like the firmsize or the training profession were
1In Germany, the corresponding figure is closer to 70 percent, see Winkelmann (1996) and Euwals and Winkelmann
(2002).
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accounted for.2 This result goes in line with the observation made by Neuba¨umer and Bellmann
(1999) that the training intensity was particularly high in industries where previous studies (see
von Bardeleben et al. 1995) had shown low or even negative net costs for apprentices.3
Sto¨ger and Winter-Ebmer (2001) found that the number of apprentices trained in Austria
declined over time, but they were not able to find explanations for this time-trend. As in Germany
and Switzerland, they observed that large firms are more likely to train apprentices, but the intensity
of training is the highest for small firms.
In a different type of analysis, Fouge`re and Schwerdt (2002), comparing the French and the
German apprenticeship system, analysed the determinants of firms’ offer of apprenticeship positions.
Using a production function approach, they found evidence that apprentices participate significantly
in the production process only in medium size firms. They conclude from this result, that small
and large firms train apprentices less for the motive of exploiting the value of their productivity,
but rather because of their difficulty to find skilled workers on the external labour market.
Beckmann (2002) finally used a zero-inflated negative binomial model to test the implications
of the theory proposed by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a, 1999b) for firms from West and
East Germany. He defined two regimes, one where firms will never train apprentices, and a second
regime, in which firms can both train zero or a positive number of apprentices. He found evidence
that a high degree of estimated wage compression encourages firms to train apprentices. His findings
apply only for companies for which he assumed positive net costs of apprenticeship training, as he
excluded firms from his sample for which he assumed zero or negative net cost of training (companies
with less than five employees). Such a reduction of the sample of analysed firms is in our view
inappropriate to analyse the overall decision of firms to train apprentices, both in Germany and
Switzerland. Furthermore, with the data used in this study, such assumptions are not necessary as
the net cost of training can be included directly in the estimation of the number of apprenticeship
positions offered by a firm.
2Niederalt et al. (2001) found similar results for a small sample of 27 Bavarian companies for which they had
calculated the cost of apprenticeship training.
3An assessment of the German situation was repeated in an analysis made by Dietrich (2000).
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4 Data
The data used here is from two representative surveys conducted in Swiss firms in the year 2001
by the Centre for Research in Economics of Education at the University of Berne and the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office (see Schweri et al., 2003 or Wolter and Schweri 2002). In one survey,
training firms were asked about their cost and benefit of apprenticeship training. In the second
survey, non-training firms were asked to fill in the identical questionnaire as training firms, but
without the questions directly related to the costs and benefits of training. The original dataset
contains 2352 training firms and 2230 non-training firms, but the public sector has been excluded,
because the profit-maximizing principle does not fully apply to such firms. Also excluded are firms
that cannot make independent decisions about training because they are part of a larger enterprise.
The dataset used in this paper embraces 1971 training firms and 1661 non-training firms. Table 1
shows the means and standard deviations of the variables.
— Table 1 —
The dataset is very similar to a German survey that was carried out by the ”Bundesinstitut fu¨r
Berufsbildung” in Bonn (BIBB) for many years. The questionnaires are specifically designed to
calculate the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training for training firms on the one hand and
to find out why firms do not train on the other hand; all variables that are seen as important in
the literature have been included. This gives us the advantage over other studies, in that we do
not need to rely on a reduced set of variables.
For training firms, the net cost of apprenticeship training is difference between the cost and
benefits. The observed cost were calculated as follows: training cost are the wages of apprentices
and the cost for the training personnel, which add up in equal shares to about 90 percent of total
cost. The remaining 10 percent are cost for material, infrastructure, external courses and other.
The calculation of training costs shows clearly that the main part of it is driven by wages.
Consequently, training cost differences between firms depend on variables that influence either the
wage level of apprentices or training personnel. The wages of apprentices are closely related to wage
recommendations of professional associations. Hence, the variation of wages within a profession
is relatively small, and a substantial part of this can be explained with the size of a firm. Larger
firms tend to offer higher wages to apprentices, which is in line with the fact that larger firms offer
higher wages to all categories of workers. Analogously to standard wage regressions, the average
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wages of the training personnel in a firm can be best explained using variables such as firm size,
industry and regional characteristics. The remaining cost for material, infrastructure and external
courses are mainly determined by the training profession.
The benefits are calculated by the type of work the apprentices perform. It is broken down into
production activities that would otherwise be performed by unskilled workers or skilled workers.
While we can assume in the first case that the apprentice’s performance has the same value as that
of an unskilled worker, the value of the apprentice’s performance for the second case is compared
to that of a fully trained skilled worker. Much of the variation in the benefits of apprenticeship
training can be explained with the determinants of both the apprentices wages and the wages of
skilled workers, and the profession in which an apprentice is trained.4
Given the importance of training professions for the net cost calculation, it is a major advantage
of the data set used in this study that the survey was carried out profession specific. It should be
noted that the training profession has only been included in the study of Beicht et al. (2004) and the
dataset used in this study; all earlier studies (see below) of the cost and benefits of apprenticeship
training had no information on the trained profession.
Other variables potentially influencing cost and benefit of apprenticeship training used in the
literature, such as process innovation, product innovation, current revenue, modernity of technical
equipment as well as expectations of future revenue (see Franz et al. 2000 or Beckmann 2002) were
also tested in our analysis. However, we did not find any significant impact neither on the training
decision nor on the net costs of training.5
Figure 1 shows the distribution of net cost for the 1971 training firms. The average is negative
(benefits exceed cost) at CHF -6,174. Net cost are negative for 60 percent of all training firms
and depend largely on the training profession, firm size, industry and regional characteristics for
the reasons given above. The findings confirm earlier studies that directly measured the costs of
apprenticeship training, e.g. von Bardeleben et al. (1995) for Germany, Lassnigg and Steiner (1997)
for Austria, and Hanhart and Schulz (1998) for Switzerland.6
4For more details on the cost and benefit model used in this study see Wolter et al. (2006) or Schweri et al. (2003).
5Since we do not have a panel dataset, we cannot observe the effects of real economic and demographic variables
over time, but we can proxy them by the firms expectation about the future developments.
6So far, detailed and representative studies that directly measure the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training
have - to our knowledge - only been carried out in German speaking countries. However, the OECD has started
a collaborative project in its statistical network to establish guidelines on how to measure the cost of vocational
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5 Econometric models and empirical analysis
In order to estimate the effect of net cost of training on the training decision, we require the
potential net cost for currently non-training firms, which we naturally cannot observe. Hence, we
need to estimate these counterfactual costs, and the first subsection shows how to do that. In the
next subsection, we present different count data models in order to estimate the effect of predicted
net cost on the number of apprentices employed in a firm. A particular feature of the data is the
high proportion of zeros, i.e., the large fraction of non-training firms. These observations represent
a corner solution. Therefore, we concentrate on count data models for corner solutions, so-called
“hurdle models”. A useful property of these models in the present context is that they allow us to
distinguish between cost elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins. The third subsection
presents the results.
5.1 Estimation of potential net cost
The net cost of training are observed only for training firms. To use these costs to estimate the
potential cost of training for currently non-training firms, we have to realize that training firms
are not a random sample from the universe of all firms, and that training and non-training firms
may differ systematically in observable and unobservable characteristics. In order to account for
observable differences, we use a linear regression framework according to which
y1j = x′1jβ1 + ε1j j = 1, . . . , 3632 (1)
where y1j are net cost and x1j is a vector containing variables such as firm size, number of skilled
workers, industry, apprenticeship profession, region, ownership of the firm and a variable indicating
whether a firm would like to reduce the time an apprentice spends in vocational school.7
We don’t estimate a log-linear model because net cost can be positive as well as negative. If βˆ1
is a consistent estimator for β1, we can predict the net cost for non-training firms consistently as
yˆnt1j = x
nt′
1j βˆ1.
However, direct estimation of (1) by ordinary least squares using training firms only leads to
selection bias as long as training and non-training firms differ in unobservables as well observables.
training.
7The last variable will be used later on to identify the cost elasticity in a “structural” model. It is assumed to
affect the number of apprentices only through net cost.
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Let
y2j =
 1 if firm j trains0 if firm j does not train (2)
Selection bias arises if E(ε1j |y2j = 1) 6= E(ε1j |y2j = 0). We follow here a standard Heckman
approach with a latent continuous variable for the training decision:
y2j = 1 [x′2jβ2 + ε2j < 0] (3)
This is a reduced form version of the firms’ profit maximization condition, according to which
firms train as long as the marginal benefit of doing so is positive. The benefit of training has two
components. First, an immediate benefit arises if the net cost of training are negative. Secondly,
a benefit can arise in later periods, for example because the firm needs skilled workers and it may
be difficult to recruit such workers in the outside labour market. This reasoning implies that x2j
should include all determinants of net cost x1j . These variables obviously affect the decision to
train, although not necessarily through their influence on net cost only. They may also have an
indirect effect, by affecting other aspects of the training decision. In addition x2j includes a variable
measuring the tightness of the labor market for skilled workers (the exclusion restriction). This
variable, a dummy indicating whether a firm has difficulties finding skilled workers on the labour
market, does not influence the net cost of the apprenticeship training but it is expected to have a
significant impact on the firm’s decision to train when the net cost of the apprenticeship training
alone would be positive. The variable on labor market tightness has also been used to explain the
training behaviour of firms in a number of other studies, see e.g. Askilden and Nilsen (2005) for
apprenticeship programmes in Norway or Majumbdar (2007) for a recent example using U.S. data.
If we moreover assume that (ε1j , ε2j) are bivariate normal distributed with zero mean, covari-
ance σ12, and variances σ21 and one, respectively, we can estimate all model parameters by maximum
likelihood.
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The contribution of firm j to the log likelihood function is
Lj = (1− y2j) ln[1− Φ(x′2jβ2)]
+y2j
lnΦ
x′2jβ2 + σ12σ−21 (y1j − x′1jβ1)√
1− σ212σ−21
+ lnφ(y1j − x′1jβ1
σ1
)
− ln(σ1)

(see Wooldridge 2002).8 The estimation results are given in Table 2. The estimated ρ = σ12/σ1
is positive. The point estimate is 0.5, and a Wald test for the null hypothesis H0 : ρ = 0 has a
p-value of 0.0013, so that the null is rejected. This implies that the higher the unobserved net cost
component ε1j , the lower is the probability of training. Training firms self-select based on absolute
cost advantage.
If we use the selectivity-corrected net cost estimates in column 1 of Table 2, we find that the
predicted net cost of an average apprenticeship program of a randomly drawn firm in Switzerland
amounts to about CHF 13,608.9 — Table 2 — Of course, there is considerable variation across
firms, as seen in Figure 2 which shows a histogram of the predicted net cost of training and non-
training firms. The predictions are now based on (1) and thus conditional on x1j but unconditional
on the training decision. As expected, predicted net cost tend to be higher for non-training firms
than for training firms - the averages are CHF 18,540 and CHF 9,453, respectively. However, there
is considerable overlap in the two distributions. 5.45 percent of all non-training firms (about 8,090
firms) are predicted to have negative net cost and still do not train. At the point of time of the
survey some 5,000 offered training posts were not filled because of a lack of either any, or any
appropriate, applicants. Therefore we conjecture that more than half of these non-training firms
with negative net cost did not train for this reason. According to our model, the rest of these firms
must have a positive unobserved cost component.
In the following analysis, the predicted net cost – unconditional on the training decision –
are used as an explanatory variable in a structural model in order to estimate the cost elasticity.
8The null hypothesis of normality could not be rejected using a diagnostic test proposed by Pagan and Vella (1989,
S51)
9These results differ from the results in Wolter et al. (2006) because weights were used in the earlier paper. The
use of weights is not required to obtain consistent estimates of the regression parameters although differences in small
samples occur. From a qualitative point of view, the results remain the same with or without the use of weights. The
weights have been dropped since some of the following count data models have not been implemented for use with
weights.
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Since the dependent variable, the number of apprentices, is a non-negative integer, we discuss first
appropriate econometric models for such counts.
5.2 Count data models for the number of apprentices employed by a firm
Let nj = 0, 1, 2, . . . denote the number of apprentices employed by firm j and yˆ1j the predicted net
cost which can be positive or negative. The main objects of interest are the cost elasticity at the
extensive margin
η1 =
∂P (nj > 0)
∂yˆ1j
yˆ1j
P (nj > 0)
,
and the cost elasticity at the intensive margin
η2 =
∂E(nj |nj > 0)
∂yˆ1j
yˆ1j
E(nj |nj > 0) .
Since E(nj) = P (nj > 0)E(nj |nj > 0) it follows that the overall cost elasticity equals η1 + η2. For
example, in the Poisson regression model, where P (nj |λj) = exp(−λj)nλjj /nj ! and λj = exp(x′jδ +
γyˆ1j), we obtain that
η1 =
(
λj exp(−λj)
1− exp(−λj)
)
γyˆ1j and η2 =
(
1− λj exp(−λj)
1− exp(−λj)
)
γyˆ1j
Thus, η1 = η2 = 0 if and only if γ = 0. Obviously, this model does not allow for testing separately
for the statistical significance of intrinsic and extrinsic cost elasticities – as we would like to. An
econometric tool that allows one to perform such separate tests is provided by the class of so-called
count data hurdle models (Mullahy, 1986, Winkelmann, 2004).
A count data hurdle model combines a binary model for the training decision with a truncated-
at-zero count data model for the number of apprentices employed by training firms. The standard
formulation is the Poisson-hurdle (PH) model where the binary model is of a complementary log-log
form. The advantage of the PH model is that it nests the simple Poisson model, which thus can be
easily tested against the more general hurdle model. We present PH model as a benchmark, and in
order to assess the robustness of the main conclusion with respect to the parametric assumptions
we make.
For a number of reasons, we suspect that an alternative, recently developed hurdle model,
the Probit-Poisson-log-normal (PPLN) model (Winkelmann, 2004), is more appropriate in the
present context. First, it retains the probit structure of the binary training equation (3). The
main difference is that we now include the predicted net cost of training yˆ1j as an additional
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regressor. The variable “reduction in vocational school time is desired (yes/no)” is included in the
cost equation but excluded in the demand equation.
Secondly, the PPLN model allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the positive part of the hurdle
model. In previous research, it has been found that the alternative approach of using the negative
binomial model, based on mixing over a gamma distribution, is usually inferior to mixing over a
log-normal distribution (Winkelmann, 2003). In particular, assume that
λj = exp(x′3jδ2 + γ2yˆ1j + uj) (4)
where uj ∼ Normal(0, σ2u) independently of x3j and yˆ1j . If nj |uj is Poisson distributed, then the
unconditional model nj has the Poisson-log-normal form. While closed form expressions are not
available, the probabilities can be evaluated by Gauss-Hermite quadrature. If the Poisson log-
normal model is combined with a probit hurdle as in (3), we obtain the probit-Poisson-log-normal
model (PPLN) with probability function
f(nj) = [1− Φ(x′3jδ1 + γ1yˆ1j)]1 (nj=0) (5)
×
[
Φ(x′3jδ1 + γ1yˆ1j)
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−λj(uj))(λj(uj))nj
[1− exp(−λj(uj))]nj !
1
σu
φ(uj/σu)duj
]1 (nj>0)
where φ denoted the standard normal density. The parameters δ1, δ2, γ1, γ2 and σ2u can be jointly
estimated by maximum likelihood. A useful property of all standard hurdle models is that the
log-likelihood function has two additive parts L1(δ1, γ1) and L2(δ2, γ2, σ2u) that can be maximized
separately with respect to the corresponding parameters. In the probit Poisson log-normal model
described here, δˆ1 and γˆ1 are obtained from estimating a probit model with all data whereas the
remaining parameters are obtained by maximizing a truncated-at-zero Poisson log-normal model
using observations on training firms only.
We can now return to the question of the elasticities at the extensive and intensive margins.
For the extensive margin, the cost elasticity is readily calculated as
η1 =
φ(x′3jδ1 + γ1yˆ1j)
Φ(x′3jδ1 + γ1yˆ1j)
γ1yˆ1j
The cost elasticity for training firms cannot be calculated in closed form but it needs to be evaluated
numerically.
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5.3 Results
Tables 3 and 4 provide the estimation results for the PH and the PPLN model. We report robust
standard errors in all instances. Several tests are possible. First, a comparison of the PH and the
simple Poisson model shows that the null hypothesis of equal coefficients in the hurdle and in the
positive part is clearly rejected. Under the Poisson restriction, the likelihood ratio test statistic of
754.44 is a realization from a χ2(30) distribution with critical value 43.77. The PH and the PPLN
model are not nested. However, the substantial drop in log-likelihood from -8522.7 to -5262.2 with
just one additional parameter indicates a clear preference for the PPLN model, based for example
on the AIC criterion. Clearly, unobserved heterogeneity is an important feature of these data.
This view receives support from formal tests between non-nested model, such as the Vuong test
(Vuong, 1989). We also estimated a couple of other hurdle models available in Stata, such as a
logit-negative binomial model and a complementary log-log-negative binomial model. We found
that the PPLN model proposed here dominates both of them. Moreover, we found in all instances
the same substantive result with regard to the cost elasticities at the intensive and extensive margin,
namely a significant negative effect at the extensive margin, and no significant effect at the intensive
margin (see Table 3 for the PH results).
— Table 4 —
Table 4 gives the details for the regression coefficients in the PPLN model. The first column
gives the probit coefficients, whereas the third column shows the coefficients for the truncated-at-
zero Poisson log-normal model. The main parameter of interest is the structural effect of net cost.
The regression parameter is negative and statistically significant in the hurdle part but practically
zero for the positives. This means that an increase in net cost reduces the probability of offering
(any) training, but such an increase is unrelated to the number of apprentices a firm trains, once
it has decided to train. A potential economic explanation for this pattern is that small firms
who train a small number of apprentices have in general lower net cost of training than large firms
training many apprentices. Although training is lucrative for small firms, the number of apprentices
they employ is limited by an upper bound that depends on the number of skilled workers able to
train apprentices. If they would extend their offer of apprenticeship places beyond that limit, the
additional need for trainers (and additional infrastructure) would result in positive marginal net
cost for an additional apprentice. Large firms with positive net cost of training are not sensitive
to marginal variations, because the number of apprentices is determined by the number of future
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vacancies for skilled workers. In this situation, a reduction in the net cost of training would only
translate into an additional number of apprenticeship posts if the marginal net cost of training
were smaller than the marginal benefit for the period after the apprenticeship. The latter depends
on the probability that the firm is able to offer its former apprentice a job. This together leads
to the result that once a firm has decided to train apprentices, the number of apprentices does
not depend on marginal variations in the net costs of training. The effect of net cost is therefore
entirely restricted to the extensive margin.
To put a quantitative meaning on the estimated coefficient of -0.044, we can compute the elas-
ticity at the average values of the regressors. In this case, ηˆ1 = −0.45 - a one percent increase in
the net cost reduces the probability of training by 0.45 percent. Obviously, these marginal elastic-
ities should not be extrapolated too far, as the probit model is highly non-linear. Alternatively,
we can consider absolute percentage point changes in the probability of training. For example,
starting again from average values, an increase in net training cost by one thousand will reduce the
probability of training by 1.8 percentage points. Similarly, an increase in net training cost by one
standard deviation reduces the probability of training by 27.4 percentage points.
In order to summarize the main result of the analysis, we find that the elasticity at the intensive
margin is zero, whereas the estimated elasticity at the extensive margin amounts to -0.45, an
economically substantial effect. We conclude by mentioning some of the other results. Firm size,
measured by the number of employees, and the number of skilled workers have the expected positive
effects on both the probability of training and on the number of apprentices among training firms.
Foreign owned firms are less likely to train, as are firms in the French speaking part of Switzerland.
The training firms in the French part in addition train fewer apprentices – for given firm size, net
cost, etc.– than otherwise similar firms in the German speaking part of Switzerland. These results
largely confirm those from previous studies.
5.4 A simulation for subsidies
In the year 2000, the year of reference of our survey, about 74’500 new apprentices were employed
by Swiss firms, but not every school leaver interested in apprenticeship training was able to find a
training position. In subsequent years, the gap between the number of school leavers interested in
apprenticeship training and the number of available apprenticeship positions increased steadily due
to the unfavorable general economic climate. Political initiatives tried to fight the imbalance in the
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apprenticeship market with the idea of subsidizing firms for their training. Taking into account our
findings, the subsidy should be given to non-training firms, where it would have a large effect, but
not to training firms, where it would have no effect at all. A cost subsidy to a non-training firm
would reduce net cost of training and thereby increase the probability to offer a training position.
The question remains how much such a program would cost.
In the year 2004, according to the ”Lehrstellenbarometer 2004”, some 8,000 interested school
leavers did not succeed in finding a training position. With an average of 1.04 newly created
apprenticeship posts per training firm, one would need to attract 7,666 new training firms, an
increase in the proportion of training firms by 3.66 percentage points. As shown in the previous
section, the training ratio increases by 1.8 percentage points for each reduction in cost by CHF
1,000. Thus, the targeted increase by 3.66 percentage points requires a subsidy of CHF 1,949 per
apprentice.
Of course, it would be difficult in practice to assess whether a given firm would have offered no
training post in the absence of a subsidy, and thus to discriminate between firms who do already
train apprentices and new firms when deciding whom to offer the training subsidies. In the spirit
of our model, one would need to have detailed information on the net cost of training for that firm.
However, firms can be expected to respond strategically and overstate their true cost once such a
scheme would be in place. Therefore all known political initiatives demanding subsidies for training
start with the idea that each training post would be subsidized, and not only the “additional” ones.
This windfall gain for “old” training companies creates as a consequence much higher total costs of
the subsidy than a regime that could be targeted at the new companies only. As a consequence the
subsidies alone would amount to more than CHF 17,000 per newly created apprenticeship position.
— Table 5 —
The amount depends on the number of newly created apprenticeship places but is basically
driven by the total number of training firms. To illustrate this, a scenario with an additional
1,000 and another scenario with 10,000 additional new apprenticeship places is shown in Table 5.
To the costs of subsidies, the costs of school for an apprentice must be added, which amount on
average to CHF 15,000 per year. The total cost of education (subsidy included) of an additionally
trained apprentice would be more than CHF 60,000. For purposes of comparison, the total costs
for the highest form of a full-time general education in Switzerland (Gymnasium) are on average
CHF 58,500 for a 3-year period. Taking into account that the administration of such subsidies
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would generate additional costs of 10 to 20 percent of the total amount of subsidies, the “artificial”
creation of new apprenticeship places through subsidies seems questionable from a cost point of
view.
6 Concluding remarks
The paper has made both a methodological and a substantive contribution. On the methodological
side, it is the first time that the training decision is modelled in a structural framework. In this
empirical framework, the main parameter of interest, the cost elasticity, can be identified from
observing cost data for training firms alone. The problem that costs cannot be observed for non-
training firms is overcome by using predictions from a selectivity corrected cost equation. A hurdle
count data model is then used to estimate the structural equation, so that cost elasticities at the
extensive and intensive margins can be estimated separately. To estimate the model, we employed
a unique firm-level dataset that includes training and currently non-training firms and provides
detailed cost information for training firms.
The results are quite striking. We find that the cost elasticity at the extensive margin, i.e.
with regards to the probability whether to train or not to train, amounts to -0.45, an economically
substantial effect. By contrast, the cost elasticity at the intensive margin, i.e. for the number of
apprentices among training firms, is zero.
We close with the substantive conclusion that in order to increase the number of apprenticeship
positions offered each year, one would need to direct subsidies at non-training firms and exclude
training firms. In this case, the required subsidy would be quite modest. If, however, such a dis-
crimination is politically and practically infeasible, the costs for creating additional apprenticeship
positions would be prohibitively high.
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Tables
Table 1: Sample descriptives
(N=3632; sampling weights have been used.)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Training firm 0.291 0.454
Number of apprentices 0.675 3.878
Firm size 1-3 0.331 0.471
Firm size 4-9 0.403 0.491
Firm size 10-49 0.224 0.417
Firm size 50-99 0.023 0.151
Firm size >100 0.019 0.135
ln (Number of skilled workers) 0.313 3.035
Sector: Service 0.679 0.467
Industry 0.136 0.343
Construction 0.119 0.324
German part of Switzerland 0.750 0.433
French part of Switzerland 0.222 0.416
Italian part of Switzerland 0.029 0.167
Foreign firm ownership 0.116 0.320
Difficulties in finding qualified labor 0.403 0.491
Reduction in school days 0.113 0.317
Commercial employee 0.177 0.381
Polymechanics technician 0.019 0.136
IT specialist 0.028 0.164
Cook 0.070 0.255
Electromechanics technician 0.020 0.139
Mason 0.025 0.157
Architectural draftsperson 0.030 0.171
Salesperson (2 years) 0.062 0.242
Salesperson (3 years) 0.026 0.159
Auto mechanic 0.020 0.141
Carpenter 0.025 0.155
Office worker 0.033 0.180
Assistant in a doctor’s office 0.021 0.145
Structural draftsperson 0.010 0.100
Hairdresser 0.017 0.129
Automation technician 0.004 0.063
Electronics technician 0.004 0.064
Other professions 0.409 0.492
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Table 2: MLE selection model, Dependent variable: Net cost of training
Net Cost Training yes/no
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Industrial sector -1510.6 (2687.3) 0.145† (0.066)
Construction sector -7799.4† (3579.8) 0.329† (0.087)
French part of Switzerland 1733.4 (2580.1) -0.240† (0.060)
Italian part of Switzerland 8479.1 (5750.7) 0.044 (0.144)
Foreign-owned company 5617.6 (3212.0) -0.615† (0.074)
Firm size: 4-9 employees -3631.6 (3561.6) 0.168† (0.069)
Firm size: 10-49 employees -6742.8 (4148.2) 0.362† (0.085)
Firm size: 50-100 employees -8341.6 (5029.0) 0.862† (0.109)
Firm size: >100 employees -4287.8 (5499.7) 1.104† (0.121)
Reduction in school days 8327.6† (3753.6) -0.368† (0.082)
Number of skilled workers (ln) -2498.7† (1095.1) 0.317† (0.031)
Difficulties in finding qualified labor 0.303† (0.049)
ρ 0.503 (0.079)
σ1 42580.8 (1152.2)
Log-Likelihood -25551.2
Observations 1971 3632
†Effect is significant at the 5 percent level. The reference site is a Swiss-owned company located
in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, has more than 100 employees. The model includes in
addition a constant and 17 indicator variables for the training profession.
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Table 3: Demand for apprentices - Poisson hurdle model
(training yes/no) (# apprentices 1+)
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Industrial Sector 0.147 (0.073) -0.158 (0.162)
Construction sector 0.090 (0.124) -0.263 (0.213)
French part of Switzerland -0.232 (0.073) -0.808 (0.194)
Italian part of Switzerland 0.346 (0.194) -0.264 (0.325)
Foreign-owned firm -0.389 (0.099) -0.003 (0.178)
Firm size: 4-9 employees 0.115 (0.096) -0.224 (0.174)
Firm size: 10-49 employees 0.175 (0.125) -0.330 (0.297)
Firm size: 50-100 employees 0.587 (0.148) -0.413 (0.372)
Firm size: >100 employees 0.928 (0.137) -0.035 (0.290)
Number of skilled workers (ln) 0.206 (0.040) 0.685 (0.064)
Difficulties in finding qualified workers 0.330 (0.055) 0.128 (0.122)
Net cost of training (in thousands) -0.046 (0.011) -0.025 (0.025)
Log-Likelihood -1876.7 -6646.6
Observations 3632 1971
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The model includes in addition a constant and 17
indicator variables for the training profession.
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Table 4: Demand for apprentices - Probit -Poisson log normal hurdle model
(training yes/no) (# apprentices 1+)
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Industrial Sector 0.072 (0.069) -0.061 (0.063)
Construction sector -0.013 (0.114) -0.111 (0.125)
French part of Switzerland -0.150 (0.065) -0.465 (0.068)
Italian part of Switzerland 0.374 (0.174) -0.372 (0.162)
Foreign-owned firm -0.373 (0.090) -0.044 (0.085)
Firm size: 4-9 employees 0.013 (0.077) 0.081 (0.135)
Firm size: 10-49 employees 0.063 (0.107) 0.346 (0.154)
Firm size: 50-100 employees 0.500 (0.135) 0.496 (0.168)
Firm size: >100 employees 0.919 (0.130) 0.823 (0.154)
Number of skilled workers (ln) 0.208 (0.040) 0.522 (0.035)
Difficulties in finding qualified workers 0.291 (0.050) 0.080 (0.049)
Net cost of training (in thousands) -0.044 (0.009) 0.012 (0.108)
ln(σ) -0.589 (0.036)
Log-Likelihood -1871.6 -3390.6
Observations 3632 1971
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Model includes in addition a constant and 17
indicator variables for the training profession.
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Table 5: Subsidy simulation
New apprenticeship Total cost of Subsidy per newly Total cost per
positions subsidies created apprenticeship apprenticeship
(in Mio CHF) position (in CHF) position (in CHF)
8,000 139.7 17,463 62,463
1,000 15.8 15,758 60,758
10,000 179.5 17,950 62,950
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